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Abstract
In the Chinese feudal society, heavy penalties on officials have been a persistent 
method to combat corruption in the legislation. The heavy penalties not only play a 
significant role in the ancient times, but also provide great benefits and references 
for nowadays campaign to combat corruption and uphold integrity.
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1. THE REASONS FOR THE HEAVY PENALTIES ON 
OFFICIALS
In the feudal society, why there would be a class contradiction, peasant uprising 
and regime instability? The reason lies at the officials’ vanity and corruption. 
Therefore, every feudal dynasty has paid much attention to the control of officials’ 
vanity and desire for money and power. In order to make officials more honest and 
clean, different dynasties have developed many measures and programs to prevent 
corruption and promote integrity. For example, the selection and appointment 
of officials, exams and inspections, ideological education and corresponding 
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rewards and punishments. These measures have indeed achieved some 
results.
1.1 Maintain Political Governance 
The reasons for Chinese ancient heavy penalties can be roughly concluded into 
two points: Firstly, officials were the link connecting the emperors and the people, 
and the emperors managed the people through the control of officials. Therefore, 
it’s necessary to properly manage officials before ruling people, and there was a 
creed that an enlightened emperor would attach more importance to regulate his 
officials rather than ruling his people. If the regulation has been improperly, there 
would have been a social atmosphere of corruption and political unrest. Secondly, 
in ancient China executive power and judicial power were integrated, and officials’ 
judicial power and legal enforcement power were also integrated, so they must 
have taken responsibilities while enjoying rights. Officials’ illegal activities would 
have serious impacts and harms to law. In short, heavy penalties on officials made 
full use of the contradictions between officials and people to cover up the problems 
between peasantry and regime. The central government implemented strict penalties 
on officials to ease the discontent of peasants, avoid uprising and ensure the stability 
of state power.
1.2 Maintain Economic Governance
The economic reasons for heavy penalties mainly refer to corruption and bribery, in 
another word, a use of state power to make the benefit for one’s own. Ancient China 
can be called as the era when right dominated all, so right may also be considered 
as a general equivalent and corruption considered as the redistribution of right (Liu, 
1988, p.136). However, not everyone could redistribute right, and it must have been 
controlled by the ruler. This is because ancient China was characterized by “four in 
one”, and the “four” represented governments, merchants, big landlords and usurers 
(Wang, 1981, p.122). Although bureaucracy could bring officials economic rights 
and political status, it made some officials do something violating morality in order 
to obtain a higher political status. Most rulers adopted heavy penalties to prevent 
power seizure, defend their economic positions and consolidate rules.
2. CONTENT OF THE HEAVY PENALTIES ON OFFICIALS
2.1 Heavier Legal Punishment on Officials Than Ordinary People
Firstly, there were slight differences between the sentencing of corruption and 
theft. Because the objects of the violations were public properties, lawmakers put 
corruption on a par with theft from the ancient times. Since the appearance of “Fa 
Jing” (China’s first feudal code), China has established a legal thought to inflict 
severe punishments on thieves. Then why officials’ bribery was sentenced more 
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severely than theft? Because the officials were the implementers and protectors 
of state power, and if the officials committed embezzlement and accepted bribe, 
the society would be more corrupt. Such acts of officials undermined their own 
integrity, shook state power and even challenged the dignity of law. Therefore, 
penalties on officials’ corruption and bribery were rigorous.
Secondly, as long as an official was involved with a pecuniary interest or 
bribery, he would be subject to a legal penalty irrespective of the amount of the 
bribery. As long as he committed bribery he would be subject to a punishment, 
and the amount was just a criterion to measure the severity of the crime. In the 
Qin Dynasty, an official would be punished for the corruption of even a coin, 
such as face tattooing, fortification building, trenching and other coolies.1 In the 
Northern Wei Dynasty, a local governor would be sentenced to death for the 
acceptance of a sheep or a cup of wine.2 According to the law of Tang Dynasty, if 
a local governor accepted the bribe and the amount of bribery equaled to a ruler 
of silk, he would be sentenced to 100 beatings with wooden staves. If the amount 
was more than a bolt of silk, he would be subject to a harsher punishment, and 
when the amount reached fifteen bolt of silk, he would be sentenced to be hanged. 
Even if an official did not offend the law, he would be subject to a lightened 
punishment of ninety beatings, and if the amount reached fifteen bolt of silk, he 
would be sentenced to forced labor or exile. These punishments aimed to stabilize 
the society and consolidate the state power.
Moreover, an official would be subject to a punishment if he obtained pecuniary 
interests in any form. In the Tang Dynasty, for example, an official would be 
punished even if he accepted other people’s things indirectly. He would be punished 
for the acceptance of money as well as other things, such as meat, food, wine, fruit 
or other objects which would be deemed as bribery. Even for those officials who had 
left their positions, they would also be punished for the acceptance of things from 
the people of their former jurisdiction, but the punishment would be different and 
three-class reduction of the original punishment. In addition, request of others’ help 
was also illegal. If a transaction involved no money but only personal connection, 
and the official just nodded or made a verbal commitment, it would be considered 
a crime. In ancient times, punishments were severe to different degrees due to 
different subjects, and local governors were punished more heavily than other 
officials.
2.2 Crime Was Consistent With Punishment
From a perspective of legislation, heavy punishment on officials not blindly aimed 
to aggravate punishment, but to inflict corresponding penalty according to the 
1 Bamboo Slips in the Sleeping Tiger Tomb of Qin Dynasty. Legal Questions and Answers.
2 Wei Shu. Punishment.
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crime. Take Tang Dynasty as another example, Ming Li Lv has provided six kinds 
of crimes linked with stolen goods. The Ming Dynasty made an development and 
inheritance to this, and put “embezzlement”, “theft” and “robbery” at the first place 
of the six crimes, which showed that officials’ corruption was an extremely serious 
matter to be struck. As far as the officials’ positions be concerned, the severity of 
the crimes committed in different positions was different. They had the following 
characteristics: Firstly, the people under punishment included local governor (chief) 
and executive officer. If a local governor accepted a bribe amounting to a ruler of 
silk, he would be sentenced to 100 beatings with wooden staves. If the amount 
was more than a bolt of silk, he would be given a harsher punishment, and when 
the amount reached fifteen bolt of silk, he would be sentenced to be hanged.3 If an 
executive officer sought interests by personal connection, he would be punished 
with 100 beatings. If the executive officer violated law, he would be subject to the 
same punishment as the governor, but because he managed national dignitaries 
indirectly, the law stipulated that the death punishment could be one-class deduced.4 
Secondly, public crime and private crime were distinguished from the criminal’s 
motivations. Public crime was committed because of public affairs and did not 
involve any personal feelings, which might be equivalent to dereliction of duty. 
Private crime was committed because of public affairs but involved personal 
feelings, which are equivalent to corruption today. Private crime was punished more 
harshly than public crime. Thirdly, the criterion to determine perversion of the law 
was in accordance with the harms to society. Non-perversion of law was punished 
more lightly than perversion of the law.
2.3 Debarment From Office Holding 
Imprisonment was an official system which was the life imprisonment imposed 
on the guilty officials and their relatives in ancient China. In fact, imprisonment 
deprived people of political rights (Chen, 1977, pp.213-214). In China, the earliest 
imprisonment appeared in the Qin and Han Dynasties, which were the laws to 
remove the officials’ titles and dismiss them from office. In the Sui Dynasty, 
imprisonment has changed to be an additional punishment. The law stipulated 
that if an official was suspected of embezzlement but not up to death punishment, 
he would be given lifelong imprisonment even if he was pardoned. A lighter 
offense would be given an imprisonment of twenty years. However, sometimes the 
imprisoned official still could not restore political rights even if the punishment 
was lifted. He could not live in the capital nor enjoyed the same rights as a civilian. 
Although there was no such a punishment in the Tang Dynasty, there were the laws 
related to all officials, not just limited to the punishments on corruption and bribery. 
3 Tang Lu Shu Yi. Official System, the term of embezzlement.
4 Tang Lu Shu Yi. Official System, the term of request.
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Later dynasties have changed imprisonment to be lifelong debarment from office 
holding (Zhang, 1991, p.604). Imprisonment probably had two functions. The first 
was to imprison officials and deprive of their political rights to prevent recidivism. 
Secondly, imprisonment contained a damaged reputation and political negation, and 
involved the guilty officials’ families. In ancient China, the concept of family has 
been deeply rooted in people’s hearts, and family interests were far above personal 
interests. Therefore, if a guilty official eventually implicated his whole family, he 
would be negated the most deeply. Therefore, imprisonment was not only hazardous 
for individuals, but also had a strong impact on families. This punishment was the 
prevention for crimes. 
3.  THE EMPHASIS OF HEAVY PENALTIES ON 
OFFICIALS
The nature of the feudal rule determines that the feudal ruling class is the opposite 
of the majority of working class. Harsh penalties applied to the toiling masses, but 
this did not mean that the ruling class accommodated the darkness and corruption 
within its own class. The ruling class did not allow anyone to undermine its 
fundamental interests in any form, such as corruption, bribery, extortion, theft of 
official properties and other “dirty crimes of officials” in the ancient times. On 
the contrary, different dynasties had attached great importance to the integrity of 
officials, especially a new dynasty built from turmoil. The reason was that the 
above acts of the ruling class, like the anti-feudal struggles of the working class, 
were a serious threat to the core of feudal rule—imperial power, and also shaken 
the economic foundation of feudal rule—feudal state ownership and feudal private 
ownership of the landlord class. Therefore, “nothing is greater than punishing 
corruption in governance”, “the most urgent task of kingly ruling is to punish 
corruption” have become the principle pursued by the rulers in all dynasties. Only 
a clean, honest and impartial official team was able to bring a feudal autocratic 
country a healthy development.
In the Ming Dynasty, Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang’s assertion of managing officials 
with severe laws was dominant in legislation. There was a section named The 
Crimes of Corruption in the law which summarized corruption into six categories: 
embezzlement, theft, robbery, violation of law, non-violation of law and bribery, and 
placed the icons of the six at the top of the law to emphasize severe punishment on 
officials. Although Tang Dynasty has been harsh enough to punish corrupt officials, 
Ming Dynasty inflicted even more severe punishments. Ming Dynasty stipulated 
that two-level-harsher punishment would be imposed to the officials who were 
responsible to monitor law enforcement but committed corruption, and put it into 
the category of grievous penalties. Xue Yunsheng, a legal scholar who was well 
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versed in the laws of Tang and Ming Dynasties, pointed out that, “For the crimes 
in regard to ceremonies, customs and enlightenment, Tang Dynasty had heavier 
penalties than Ming Dynasty, but for the crimes in regard to theft, robbery and 
state treasury’s properties, Ming Dynasty had heavier penalties.” This represents 
the realities at the time. Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang has made the imperial mandate 
Da Gao himself in addition to the established laws. Da Gao is the collective 
name of the mandate Da Gao enacted in the eighteenth year of Ming Dynasty, its 
second edition and third edition enacted successively in the nineteenth year and 
the law Da Gao Gong Chen enacted in the twentieth year. It is the most important 
supplement of the law Da Ming Lü and is the special section of the criminal law. 
The most famous harsh criminal law in the Chinese history is Da Gao, which 
was a legal means of highly centralized imperial power and put very specific and 
cruel punishments on corrupt officials. Judging from the fundamental task of 
punishing officials, it put the rectification of official’s work style in the first place, 
and imposed severe punishments on various types of corruptions of officials. It 
acted as a deterrent to each corrupt official and made a tremendous contribution 
to the high concentration of imperial power and unification of centralization. 
It also created a good atmosphere for socio-economic progress, nipped the 
corruption thinking of officials in the bud, and played a major role in the stability 
of people’s livelihood and development of feudal commodity economy. It must be 
admitted that Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang’s “heavy punishments on officials” is truly 
commendable now. 
4. SUPPORT MEASURES OF PUNISHING OFFICIALS 
(ZHANG, 1990)
Firstly, play the role of supervisory authority. Supervisory authority plays a 
very important role in regulating officialdom and punishing corrupt officials 
in accordance with law. Supervisory system has taken shape and formed its 
independent system in the Qin and Han Dynasties as a product of centralism. 
The supervisory authority of the Han Dynasty took guilt impeachment, 
fault correction, official evaluation, personnel recommendation and prison 
management as the main responsibilities. As the early Han Dynasty implemented 
centralization, the supervisory authority placed emphasis on the regions under 
centralization. Emperor Wudi of Han Dynasty divided the country into thirteen 
regions, set up a provincial governor in each region who was responsible to 
monitor the subordinate counties in accordance with the “Six Rules” directly 
from him. With the development in the Wei, Jin, Ming and Qing Dynasties, the 
supervisory authority has gradually formed a network system, developed a wider 
supervisory scope and more improved legislation, and enjoyed an increasingly 
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prominent position. In order to maintain official management, the inspectors 
usually corrected ill-gotten gains and corruption to monitor officials at all levels, 
especially implemented the central government’s intentions and policies in the 
name of “undertaking a tour of inspection for the Emperor”. In the reign of 
Emperor Sui, a censor took an inspection tour to the fifty-two states in Hebei 
and impeached over two hundred corrupt or incompetent officials in his report, 
leading to shock and profound fear of the entire Shizhou County. Although 
inspector was only a lower-level official, he enjoyed a great power in combining 
the rights of monitoring and trial. He could advise great events to the emperor 
and dispose ordinary incidents without reporting, and had the right to supervise 
all the officials and even the royal families. He implemented surveillance as well 
as corrected corruption, and identified harmful affairs to the court. His right to 
report according to rumors further strengthened the deterrence, which was directly 
derived from his position as the eyes and ears of the emperor. The supervisory 
authority played a significant role in the exercise of state powers as well as their 
interactions. Therefore, Emperor Kublai Khan of Yuan Dynasty metaphorized, 
“Central secretariat is like my right hand, military affairs ministry is like my left 
hand, but censorating is the organ to cure these two hands.”5 Zhu Yuanzhang, 
the first emperor of Ming Dynasty, also held that a country had three important 
sectors, one was the central secretariat in charge of administrative affairs, one 
was the military governor in charge of military affairs, and the third was the 
censorating in charge of monitoring all the officials. Although there were so many 
departments in the court, but the most important organ was censorate. Looking at 
historical events, it can be found that supervisory authority played a significant 
role in punishing corruption and regulating official working style. 
Secondly, punish corruption while rewarding honesty. Like a unity of opposites, 
corruption punishment and honesty reward have diametrically opposed roles. As is 
well known, punishment means to impose negative punishment to corrupt officials, 
but reward means to grant positive praise and reward to an upright and enlightened 
officials. Han Dynasty launched the system of selecting filial, honest and capable 
people to be officials while punishing corruption. Emperor Wudi of Han Dynasty 
requested that every year a filial and honest civilian must have been selected to be 
an official, and if the chosen people had been a provincial examination graduate 
instead of a civilian, the convictions of great disrespect to the emperor, incapability 
or repealing office would have been imposed. Corruption punishment and honest 
reward represented to be clearly parallel in the Kao Ke system. Kao Ke system is 
a system to evaluate the integrity of officials, which have become prevalent in Qin 
Dynasty and institutionalized and legalized at the time. The Kao Ke systems of 
the Qin, Jin, Tang, Song, Ming and Qing Dynasties all took integrity and honesty 
5 Han Shu. Biography of Dong Xuan.
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as the major criterion and were exercised as the saying “officials must undertake 
assessment, and assessment must be followed with incentives and penalties. If there 
were no incentives and penalties, assessment would lose its practical significance.”6 
Reward mainly included increasing salary, promotion and rewarding the rank of 
nobility, and penalty included decreasing salary, demotion, dismission and lifetime 
dismission, etc.. If a circumstance was serious, a punishment would be given in 
accordance with the law. Although the Kao Ke system was a feudal evaluation 
system, it’s undeniable that it respected the integrity and punished corrupt officials, 
fully reflected how the ancient rulers governed the country, and played an important 
role in different dynasties. In the feudal period, honesty was the major criterion for 
official evaluation as well as an official selection, and emperor, the supreme ruler 
of the country, must also have established a strict and clean image. For example, 
Dong Xuan in the Eastern Han Dynasty, a stubborn official who was used to bluster, 
killed an attendant of the princess and received the death penalty from the furious 
emperor. In his burial, his corpse was covered by only a piece of cloth and there 
were only a few barley and a broken car found in his home. The emperor could 
not but felt a reverence for this and praised his honesty and uprightness repeatedly. 
Another example is Yu Chenglong, who was praised as “the first official clean” and 
“the most enlightened official in government” by Emperor Kangxi. 
Thirdly, decent salary for clean officials. The system of rewarding officials 
with good salary started from the prisoners in the Warring States Period, which 
reflected the essence of Chinese ancient feudal official system as well as the ancient 
maintenance way of employment. Hanfeizi said that intelligence was at a price 
instead of official position. The rank of a position directly determined the salary’s 
amount. However, salary was not the major factor determining whether an official 
could be honest, the decisive factor was the official’s class attribute and whether he 
committed corruption. Dating back to ancient times, the dynasty which supplied the 
highest salary is Song Dynasty. In the early Song Dynasty, Emperor Taizu seized 
military power in exchange of favorable treatment. During the political reform 
period of Wang Anshi, his claim was also to increase the officials’ salary to reduce 
corruption. Salary was in a variety of forms in Song Dynasty, such as vegetable, 
salary, cloth, occupational field as well as a reward of attendant, clothes and food. 
Besides, more positions with more salaries were also prevalent at the time, and there 
was even an instance that “a person enjoyed ten salaries”.7 As the officials in Song 
Dynasty could enjoy good treatments, many officials were reluctant to retire and a 
lot of elderly people still served in court.
Fourthly, draw support from social supervision. Rulers in every dynasty knew 
that government incorruption, public recognition and rise and fall of empire were 
6 Su Xun: Jia Tuo Ji Volume Nine.
7 Ye Shiqi: Cao Mu Zi Kuang.
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closely linked to each other, so they strengthened to build a clean government with 
the help of society. King Huan of Qi State established the “consultative conference” 
in the beginning of his quest for hegemony. Subsequently, King Wei proposed 
that a minister or a civilian would be granted with a finest reward for pointing 
out his mistakes in his presence, a moderate reward for submitting a letter of 
recommendation, and an inferior reward for pointing out his mistakes in market to 
reach his ears. In the Warring States Period, the Legalists advocated to promulgate 
laws to enable the people to supervise the officials. During the period of Shang 
Yang’s political reform, he proposed to allow “even women and children to learn 
about the laws”,8 and that “if the official in charge of the law does not tell people 
the contents of a law, and if the people commits a crime which he has ever inquired, 
the official will be subject to the same punishment of the crime”.9 Shang Yang’s 
claim was distinguished at the time and received with remarkable effects of the 
great order of Qin State. The Han, Tang and Ming Dynasties all developed measures 
to investigate public opinions and subordinate officials. Zhu Yuanzhang, the first 
emperor of Ming Dynasty, explicitly illustrated the necessity of the transmission 
office to understand the real situation of grassroots. He said, “Political affairs 
are like water, so I name the office transmission to hope statements get delivered 
unimpededly. If people will make suggestions or report misconducts to me, the 
officials should enumerate the reasons for their complaints in report”. The hope for 
public opinions to be delivered smoothly showed the profound political insight of 
Zhu Yuanzhang, who was an emperor of humble birth. In order to increase social 
concern to the officials, Zhu Yuanzhang has adopted two measures. Firstly, for an 
official convicted of a minor offence, he would be punished by bulleting his crime in 
the place where he had governed. If a dismissed official was reused, he would also 
write a reflection to post on the door for caution. Secondly, civilians were allowed 
to escort guilty officials to the capital, other people could not obstruct otherwise 
their whole families would be punished. The measures of the early Ming Dynasty to 
punish officials constituted an important part of the governance and received great 
achievements. Not only these mandatory measures but also the prevailing folk songs 
played an important role in punishing officials. During the reign of Dong Xuan in 
the Eastern Han Dynasty, for example, there was no one to beat the drum at court to 
appeal for justice.
5. SIGNIFICANCE OF GOVERNING OFFICIALS WITH 
HEAVY PUNISHMENTS
From a normal point of view, legal norms are somehow different realities. 
8 History of Qing Dynasty. Biography of Yu Chenlong.
9 Sui Shu. Biography of Liu Huo.
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Throughout the studies on the facts of governing officials in different dynasties, 
some governances were more stringent, some failed to carry through, and some 
ended up in breakdown. From a perspective of dynasties, some dynasties fell into 
corruption after its initial proclaim to be clean, and most of the emperors were 
much like this. The causes of this phenomenon are many, but economic foundation 
and ruling system are the fundamentals, which have been accepted by most 
scholars. For some of the problems, however, people’s views and understandings 
also vary.
From the above viewpoint it can be concluded that the effectiveness of governing 
officials is closely related with legislation, but the relationship is not decisive. 
The effectiveness of governing officials mainly depends on the improvement of 
the system, the quality of the law enforcement team, and an organic combination 
of the two. Taking into account the facts of the late feudal society, unenforceable 
implementation is an important reason for the unexpected impacts of commodity 
economy to officials. At the same time, law enforcement determines the actual 
effects of legislation. In ancient China legislation of governing officials has been 
fairly improved, but there were not enough capable people to implement. Shen 
Jiaben said that “the quality of law enforcement lies at the capabilities of the 
implementer” (Xu, 1953, p.58). Officials are the implementer as well as the target of 
the heavy punishments. Many officials could not consciously act in accordance with 
the law so that this measure would easily fall into ineffectiveness. Besides, feudal 
law could not achieve the desired effect or achieve even no effect in enforcement. 
Mencius once said, “Governing a country is not difficult, the key is to not offend 
those influential officials and families.”10 Therefore, governments of all generations 
supplied many preferential policies for officials. Because the most important 
prerequisite for a ruler was “loyalty” or even blind loyalty, “clean” was put in the 
second place, but this tolerant attitude received only worse results. “If we punish a 
subordinate official’s corruption without prosecuting and condemning the superior 
official, a harsher law will only lead to more serious corruption, bigger political 
chaos, more depressed livelihood and destruction of the country.” This was an 
important lesson.11 However, the effects of law enforcement relied on the attitude 
of the ruler, just as the saying “people’s well-being and national peace depend on 
the Emperor.” In the eyes of the emperors, law was only a tool or even tasteless 
“chicken ribs”, whose existence merely depended on their emotions. Because of 
this, many corrupt officials were not afraid of the laws but the emperors. Thus, there 
appeared an atmosphere that an emperor took the lead to circumvent the law, and 
the inspection authority had to turn a blind eye to this and made the decision not to 
prosecute.
10 Mencius • Li Lou Xia.
11 Wang Fuzhi: A Thought on Zi Zhi Tong Jian. 
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